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t. Introduction 
This contribution serves two purposes: First, it examines the development of 
selected key indicators of public opinion on national security issues in West 
Germany over the last decade (1978-87). This period includes two years 
prior to NATO's dual-track decision, the debate over, and the final deploy-
ment of new U.S. INF; the road up to the INF Treaty of December 1987; 
and the ascent to power of General Secretary Gorbachev in the Soviet 
Union. If there ever have been major reorientations in West German public 
opinion on security after the rearmament debate of the 1950s, this is the pe-
riod where they most likely must have occurred. Since it is a well-established 
fact that security-related attitudes in the Federal Republic covary quite 
strongly with partisan sympathies (Rattinger 1987), changes over time in 
these associations are also analyzed. The investigation focuses on the fol-
lowing aspects of security-related public opinion: perceptions of the Federal 
Republic's general national security environment (military balance and 
threat), attitudes toward nuclear weapons and deterrence, evaluations of the 
superpowers, attitudes toward NATO membership and U.S. forces deployed 
in West Germany, opinions about military expenditures, and evaluations of 
the Bundeswehr. Second, we attempt to present some insights on how cur-
rent national security attitudes in the Federal Republic are associated with 
political preferences and social background variables, and to what extent 
they are interrelated among each other. 
The data for this study come from a series of annual surveys conducted for 
the Federal Ministry of Defense (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed de-
scription of these surveys). At the time of writing, the original data sets were 
not yet accessible, so that only the extensive crosstabulations supplied by the 
polling institute could be used. This severely limits the sophistication of data 
analysis, of course, and accounts for many of the shortcomings of this effort. 
https://doi.org/10.20378/irbo-52769
302 
2. Some trends of public opinion 
Perceptions of the East-West military balance in the Federal Republic have 
remained quite stable over the past ten years (Figure 1). Judgments that 
NATO is superior have fluctuated between 10 and 20 percent, that the 
Warsaw Pact is superior between 30 and 40 percent, and that both blocs are 
equally strong between about 40 and 60 percent. If one looks for a substan-
tively significant shif t in these perceptions, the most likely candidate is the 
observation that since 1985 the view that both sides are equally strong has 
become more frequent than ever before in this ten-year interval, and the 
view that the Warsaw Pact is superior has correspondingly dropped below 
previous levels. This could be reversed, of course, as soon as the 1988 sur-
vey becomes available. This author would argue, however, that such a 
reversal is not likely. This shift in 1985 has coincided with the ascent of the 
new Soviet leadership, and probably reflects improvements in the general 
climate of East-West relations more than genuine assessments of the military 
balance. 
This argument is supported by the fact that sizeable parts of the public have 
considerable difficulties in judging relative military strength - which in view 
of wildly diverging assessments by military "experts" is hardly surprising 
(e.g., Mearsheimer 1982 and Posen 1988, vs. Karber 1983 and Martin 1983). 
In the 1987 survey, respondents were asked four different questions about 
force comparisons: NATO vs. Warsaw Pact in genera~ regarding conventio-
nal forces, regarding nuclear forces, and U .S. vs. USSR in general (in this 
sequence). Few people had problems commenting on the general East vs. 
West and USSR vs. U.S. questions, but 21 percent did not give a judgment 
on the conventional or on the nuclear balance (Table 1). If one excludes 
these respondents, the resulting distributions still make some sense along the 
lines of the widespread notion that Eastem military superiority is parti-
cularly acute in conventional forces, while the West still has an edge in 
nuclear capabilities. The responses to the U.S. vs. USSR question, however, 
make little sense: With very few refusals, more respondents say that the U .S. 
alone is stronger than the USSR ( or at least equally strong) than say so for 
NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the Soviet share of total Warsaw Pact 
forces is much higher, of course, than the American share of NATO forces, 
so that exactly the opposite pattem should be expected. 
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Table 1: Perceptions of the East-West military balance, 1987 
general conventional nuclear u.s.-USSR 
NATO (U.S.) superior 
East (USSR) superior 
Both equal 
DK, NA 
11 
32 
55 
2 
7 (9) 
41 (52) 
31 (39) 
21 
16 (20) 
26 (33) 
37 (47) 
21 
14 
23 
60 
3 
For complete question wording for this and all subsequent tables and figures 
see Appendix 2. Percentages in brackets are without OK, NA. 
OK, NA: Don't know, no answer 
Another interesting observation on perceptions of the military balance con-
cerns their distribution by partisan sympathy. That one encounters signifi-
cantly more people who claim that the West is superior, and less who say so 
about the East, as one traverses the political spectrum from right to lef t, has 
already been reported (e.g., Rattinger 1987, Table 1). However, this 
polarization along party lines has been reduced in 1987 when compared to 
earlier years (Figure 2). Adherents of the parties forming the current gov-
emment have remained rather stable in their perceptions, but followers of 
the Social Democrats and of the Greens have become much less likely to 
claim Western, and much more likely to detect Eastern, superiority. In 1987, 
SPD voters had become very similar to adherents of the CDU /CSU and 
FDP in their perception of the military balance, and among Green voters, 
those believing in Western superiority were almost exactly balanced by 
those stating that the W arsaw Pact is stronger. 
The trend in perceptions of a communist threat is quite similar to that de-
scribed in evaluations of the overall military balance (Figure 3). For 1978 to 
1984, the average of an index of threat perception (with minimum 0 and 
maximum 3) fluctuated between 1.4 and 1.5. In 1985 it fell to 1.3, and in 
1987 it had dropped to below 1.2. Partisan polarization about the extent of a 
threat also went down in 1987 (Figure 4): Perception of a communist threat 
decreased especially among voters for the SPD and the FDP, whereas for 
Green sympathirers it did not decrease further, so that adherents of these 
three parties were not far apart in this judgment. Only among CDU /CSU 
voters did the group that sees a threat continue to be almost as large as the 
one that does not perceive such a threat. 
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Unfortunately, this series of studies only contains questions about nuclear 
dete"ence since 1985. Over these three years, support for nuclear deterrence 
has fallen slightly to just over 50 percent (Figure 5). This decline has been 
strongest among Green and SPD voters, who also support immediate 
abolishment of nuclear weapons more frequently than maintenance of 
nuclear deterrence. lt should be pointed out, however, that SPD voters still 
are much closer to voters for the government parties in these views than to 
adherents of the Greens. lt also deserves mentioning that a substantial share 
of those who either want nuclear deterrence maintained or nuclear weapons 
eliminated make this choice under great insecurity over the eff ects of a 
nuclear-free world. When asked explicitly (in 1987) whether, without any 
nuclear weapons, war in Europe would become more likely or not, one-third 
of respondents said they did not know or refused to reply. Among the 
others, about 60 percent said it would not become more likely (Table 2). If 
one assumes that those who think that war would be more likely are fully 
contained among those who want to maintain nuclear weapons and deter-
rence, and that those who believe war would not be more likely are fully 
contained among those who would like to see nuclear weapons abolished, it 
is obvious that insecurity about the consequences of getting rid of nuclear 
weapons must be much higher among those who want to maintain nuclear 
deterrence. 
There are several explanations for this observation. First, if one prefers to 
err on the saf e side, insecurity about the effects of abolishing nuclear weap-
ons is more compatible with maintaining nuclear deterrence than with its 
immediate abolishment. Second, those who want to denucleariz.e imme-
diately might have a stronger desire to avoid cognitive dissonance. Third, the 
"normative" question about maintaining deterrence vs. eliminating nuclear 
weapons (which was asked later) is far more "radical" than the "cognitive" 
question about what difference these weapons make in terms of war pre-
vention. One thus first finds widespread insecurity and skepticism over 
whether nuclear arms really make the decisive difference for war preven-
tion, but when they are later set against the alternative of complete and 
quick denuclearization, beliefs that they actually do reduce the likelihood of 
war in Europe become much more frequent. 
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Table 2: Attitudes toward nuclear weapons and deterrence, 1987 
Total CDU/CSU SPD FDP Green 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Support nuclear deterrence, 
because without nuclear weapons 51 64 45 59 16 
likelihood of conventional war 
in Europe would be higher 
Support i11ediate abolishllent 47 35 54 41 84 
of nuclear weapons 
DK, BA 2 1 1 0 0 
Without nuclear weapons and 
deterrence war in Europe would 26(39) 35(53) 20(30) 27(42) 11(13) 
be 1ore likely 
Without nuclear weapons and 
deterrence war in Europe would 41(61) 31(47) 46(70) 38(58) 77(87) 
not be 10re likely 
DK, HA 33 34 34 35 12 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentages in brackets are without DK, NA. 
Not surprisingly, evaluations of the Soviet Union have changed much more 
in recent years than the attitudes discussed so far. Figure 6 shows how 
"Gorbimania" has brought suspicion vis-a-vis the Soviet Union down quite 
dramatically. Up to 1984, skeptical opinions about Soviel intentions out-
numbered positive ones; in 1987, 75 percent were positive. In contrast, the 
popular image of the U.S. in the Federal Republic has not changed much, 
even though one can be tempted to detect a (much smaller) revival of posi-
tive evaluations in 1987, most likely due to the prospect of the INF agree-
ment and of the resulting removal of the new nuclear weapons stationed in 
Europe after 1983. These evaluations of the superpowers have lost some of 
their polarization along party lines in recent years. From 1986 to 1987 the 
image of the U.S. improved most among Green voters (even though it still is 
quite negative), and the image of the Soviet Union improved most among 
voters for the governing parties (Figures 7 and 8). 
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Support for West German membership in NATO has fluctuated between 80 
and 90 percent over the past ten years, with a clear but slow downward 
trend (Ftgure 9). Opposition against the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the 
Federal Republic has also declined somewhat over the early 1980s, but this 
has not continued since 1984; opposition now stands at about 75 percent, 
compared to about 80 percent in the late 1970s. These observations cor-
respond, of course, to the decreased sense of Eastem military superiority 
and of threat, but it should be stressed that up to the mid-1960s, en-
dorsement of NATO and of American troop deployment bad been much 
lower in the Federal Republic than they are now. Partisan disagreement on 
these issues continues to be very strong and stable: In 1987, 94 percent of 
CDU/CSU voters favored continuing West German membership in NATO, 
and 89 percent were opposed to withdrawal of U.S. troops. Corresponding 
figures for FDP adherents were 98 and 79 percent, 85 and 74 percent among 
SPD sympathizers, and 41and24 percent, respectively, for Green partisans. 
With the exception of a small "shock" in 1980 - probably due to the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan - attitudes toward West German defense spending 
confirm what we have seen so far (Figure 10). The view that the Federal 
Republic spends too little has declined somewhat, and clearly is held by a 
small minority. The opposite view has risen from below 30 to over 40 per-
cent, and the notion that military expenditures are adequate has fallen from 
somewhat below 60 to under 50 percent. Partisan polarization over this mat-
ter is strong and stable (Figure 11). SPD adherents are about evenly split 
among the views that these outlays are insufficient or adequate, on the one 
band, and exaggerated, on the other. Green voters overwhelmingly hold the 
latter opinion, and voters for the govemment parties are least opposed to 
current levels of defense spending. As can be seen in Figure 11, the shift in 
the aggregate distributions over the past three years toward more skepticism 
vis-a-vis West German military expenditures was mainly due to Green and 
FDP voters. The former have moved even further away from the sym-
pathizers of the "established" parties over this issue, and the latter have now 
become more similar to SPD than to CDU /CSU voters. 
But these judgments about the size of the West German military budget ob-
viously are quite unstable ones for some respondents. When, in 1987, they 
were asked (immediately preceding the question about too high, too low, or 
adequate) whether - given the present international situation - the Federal 
Republic should spend less on defense, more, or as much per capita as other 
Western and Eastem nations, the latter response was chosen by more people 
than the view that defense spending is "about right," and the opinion that it 
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Figure 9: Attitudes toward NATO and U.S. troops 
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should be reduced was less frequent than that the Federal Republic was 
spending "too much" (Table 3). These discrepancies were weakest for 
CDU/CSU voters, and strongest for adherents of the Greens. Of course one 
could argue that this category of "as much as others" can be interpreted at 
will. Those who want reductions might think of Denmark or Luxembourg; 
those who want increases might use the superpowers as points of reference. 
However, such respondents could have simply and directly said that they fa-
vored reductions or increases, as these answers were also offered. There-
fore, "as much as others" probably serves as an intermediate category equiv-
alent to "about right." But if that is so, it is puzzling that it is chosen more 
often, and reductions are less frequently advocated, if people are reminded 
of the international situation and of others' behavior. 
Another indication of how insecure people are in their views on military ex-
penditures is found in the responses to a question also asked in 1987 (pre-
ceding the above two items), whether nuclear weapons and current levels of 
defense spending should be maintained, or whether nuclear weapons should 
be eliminated and defense spending be increased as compensation (Table 3). 
In contrast to the other two questions, there were some refusals and "don't 
knows," but the surprising fact is that almost two-thirds (even 70 percent of 
those with an opinion) preferred the combination of denuclearization of 
Western defense with increased military expenditures. The majority in favor 
of this combination was smallest among FDP voters, but SPD and Green 
voters, who otherwise have the most reservations about defense spending, 
were most willing to accept it. We thus have the striking fact that 90 percent 
of Green voters believe that West German military expenditures are too 
high, but 77 percent of them (94 percent of those with an opinion) at the 
same time want to spend even more, in order to see nuclear weapons elimi-
nated. Even though 18 percent of the Green voters did not respond to this 
question (probably because they think that denuclearization and cuts of de-
fense expenditures should both be achieved), the anti-nuclear affect seems 
to be much stronger than their opposition to the present level of West 
German defense outlays. 
Attitudes toward the Bundeswehr, finally, have changed only little over the 
past decade (Figure 12). Between 85 and 90 percent of samples have con-
sistently endorsed the view that its existence makes peace more secure, 
rather than being a threat to peace. Only a small realignment of about three 
percentage points seems to have occurred, if the earlier and later years 
within this ten-year interval are compared, and this is almost exclusively due 
to the growth of the Green electorate. Among CDU /CSU and FDP voters, 
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Table 3: Attitudes toward defense spending, 1987 
Total CDU/CSU SPD FDP Green 
Def ense spending of the 
Federal Republic is: 
Too much 45 29 48 40 90 
About right 47 61 44 53 6 
Too little 6 9 7 6 3 
DK, NA 2 1 1 1 1 
In view of the international 
situation the Federal 
Republic should: 
Reduce def ense spending 39 24 45 34 77 
Spend as much per capita as 
other nations in West and East 52 64 50 60 18 
Increase def ense spending 7 11 5 6 5 
DK, NA 2 1 0 0 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Support retaining nuclear 
weapons and current level 28(30) 35(36) 23(26) 39(41) 5 (6) 
of def ense spending 
Support abolishing nuclear 
weapons and increasing spend- 64(70) 63(64) 67(74) 56(59) 77(94) 
ing f or conventional def ense 
DK, NA 8 2 10 5 18 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentages in brackets are without DK, NA. 
evaluations of the Bundeswehr as dangerous for peace are very rare, and 
only about 10 to 12 percent of SPD followers hold this opinion. Green vot-
ers, however, usually are about evenly split over this issue of whether the 
existence of the Bundeswehr is good or dangerous for the preservation of 
peace. Apart from this segment of the electorate, the Bundeswehr thus has 
come through the turmoil of the 1980s without any damage to its general ac-
ceptance in West German public opinion. 
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3. The structure of public opinion 
3.1. Covariation with social background 
We now turn to the second set of main questions of this contribution, i.e., 
how public opinion on national security issues in the Federal Republic is re-
lated to social background variables and to partisan pref erences of re-
spondents, and what interrelations among these attitudes can be observed. In 
contrast to the previous section, we will here draw on the full range of items 
asked in the 1987 survey. In addition, we will compare the findings for 1987 
with those for 1986, whenever a question was included in both years. The 
strength of these associations (Tables 4 and 5) is measured by Pearson's 
contingency coefficient C, adjusted for degrees of freedom (see note to 
Table 4). 
As social background variables, sex, age, education, occupation, and inf or-
mation about whether the respondent himself (or husband or son) currently 
is ( or has been) in the Bundeswehr are available. With these five variables 
and 33 questions, a total of 165 associations are reported in Table 4 for 
1987. One hundred twenty one out of these (i.e., almost three out of four) 
are significantly different from zero. With a sample size of almost 2,000, this 
is hardly surprising, of course, as sometimes ( depending upon degrees of 
freedom) even adjusted C-values as low as .08 already qualify for statistical 
significance. 
In terms of absolute magnitude, however, the associations reported in Table 
4 between national security attitudes and the positions of respondents in the 
social structure generally are low to very low. Their overall absolute mean 
for 1987 is .14. Answers to these 33 questions about national security issues 
appear to be related most strongly to age and occupation (with average 
absolute C of .18 and .17, respectively). The older respondents are, the more 
they tend tobe in favor of military defense, the Western alliance, the Bun-
deswehr, etc. (see the notes to Table 4 for the coding of the "direction" of 
variables). Self-employed respondents and public servants tend to be most 
skeptical vis-a-vis defense matters, and blue-collar and white-collar em-
ployees are least skeptical, with retired respondents usually in between. With 
C = .14, education follows next, skepticism and opposition growing with 
length of education. Direct or indirect experience with the Bundeswehr 
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Table 4: Associations between national security attitudes and social back-
ground variables, 1987 and 1986 
Resp. or 
husb. or 
Edu- Occu- son in Abs. 
Sex Age cation pation Bundesw. mean 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National security environment 
-12b Military balance -16c 19C -13c 05 14 
1986: -14C 16C -16c -12a 04 12 
U.S.-USSR mil. balance -11b 11 -11a -14C 04 10 
1986: -13C 07 -08 -14C 04 09 
Nuclear balance -06 16b -10 -24c 09a 13 
Conventional balance -19c 10 15c -13c 02 13 
Communist threat -04# 11c -2oc -14b -05 12 
1986: 18c 13b -17C -13a 07 14 
Feasibility of defense 05 08 -13b -10a -04 08 
1986: 02 09 -07 -08 -03a 07 
Abs. mean 1987 10 14 14 17 05 12 
Comparable mean 1987 09 14 14 14 05 11 
Abs. mean 1986 12 11 12 12 06 11 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear weapons and deterrence 
-04# Nuclear deterrence -09b 16C -13c 06 11 
1986: -07a 18c -13c -13b 06 12 
Likelihood of war with-
out nuclear weapons 00 12 -15c -08 04 08 
Abs. mean 1987 05 14 10 13 05 09 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Superpowers 
Relations FRG-USSR -05 -10 1oa 09 -05 08 
1986: -1ob -2oc 16c 10 -04 12 
USSR abuses cooperation -04 19C* -12b -15c 021 10 
1986: 02 07 -21c -13c 14c 12 
u.s. want mil. equilibr. 07 16c -11a -15c 11b 12 
1986: 04 2oc -19c -17C 11b 14 
Abs. mean 1987 05 15 11 13 06 10 
Abs. mean 1986 05 16 19 15 10 13 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 4 (continued) Resp. or 
husb. or 
Edu- Occu- son in Abs. 
Sex Age cation pation Bundesw. mean 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NATO and u.s. troops 
NATO 1ellbership of FRG 10a 26c -15c -17C 17c 17 
1986: 06 20c -18C -10 19c 15 
Withdrawal U.S. troops 07a 24c -15c -19c 15c 16 
1986: 02 19c -15C -09 06 10 
u.s. troops secure peace -01 26c -1oa -18C 1ob 13 
1986: -04 21c -19c -08 12c 13 
u.s. troops improve 
-12b security of FRG 27c -13C -24C 28C 22 
1986: -17C 24c -25c -1sb 25c 21 
Benef it from Am. troops -10a 27c -14C -22c 15c 18 
1986: -09a 17C -2QC -19c 09a 15 
Feasibility of defense 
without u.s. troops -03 14c -03a -11a 09a 09 
1986: 01 13b -06 -07 01 06 
Rel. Germans-u.s. troops 1oa 23c -18C -2QC 13b 17 
1986: 1oa 20c -27c -14b 13b 17 
FRG-French brigade 00 11a 07 13C 1ob 09 
Abs. mean 1987 07 22 13 19 15 15 
Comparable mean 1987 08 24 14 19 16 16 
Abs. iean 1986 07 19 19 12 12 14 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military expenditures and behavior in case of attack 
Keep nuclear weapons or 
-12b rely on conventional -03 08 -12a 03 08 
International situation 
and 1ilitary spending -13C 23C -17C -17C 17C 17 
1986: -12b 19c -12b -14C 2oc 15 
Military spending -15c 23c -13c# -22c 20c 21 
1986: -19c 22c -30C -13a 23c 21 
Behavior if attacked -5oc -24c 20c* 13c 29c 28 
1986: -43C -25c 08 24c 32c 27 
Abs. mean 1987 20 21 17 17 17 18 
Comparable 1ean 1987 26 25 19 19 22 22 
Abs. mean 1986 26 22 17 17 25 21 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 4 (continued) Resp. or 
husb. or 
Edu- Occu- son in Abs. 
Sex Age cation pation Bundesw. 11ean 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bundeswehr 
Interest in Bundeswehr -4oc -1oa 21c 11a 15c 19 
1986: .31c -19c 19c 14b 15c 20 
Bundesw. good for peace 00 27c .14c 19c 2oc 16 
1986: -05 20c -21c 09 21c 15 
ArllS of Bundesw. suffic. -06 07 -06 -1oa -02 06 
1986: -07a 09 -14C -05 07a 08 
Training and leadership 
of Bundesw. sufficient 07 22c -18c -17C 06 14 
1986: 11a 13a .17C -11 12b 13 
Evaluation of voluntary 
-26c* 11ilitary service -14C 34C -22c 21c 25 
1986: -10 27c -24c -15b 3oc 21 
Eval. of draft resisters 14C -29c 1sbl 21c -29c 23 
1986: 17c -22c 2~ 21c -21c 22 
Kanpower problems of 
Bundeswehr are serious 05 26c .17c 19c 16c 17 
1986: 04 24c -21c 13a 17C 18 
Association of Bundes-
wehr with parties 15c 09 -15c# -13b 04 11 
1986: 16C 19c -29c -22c 12b 20 
Abs. aean 1987 13 21 16 18 15 17 
Abs. 11ean 1986 13 19 22 14 17 17 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peace 1ove11ent 
Esti1ated popular support 11a -1sb 07 08 11a 10 
1986: 13b -21c 1sb 17c -13b 16 
Goals of peace movementd 12a 16c 14a 19c 10 14 
1986: 17C 22c 16C 15a 16C 17 
Abs. 1ean 1987 12 16 11 14 11 12 
Abs. 11ean 1986 15 22 16 16 15 17 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall abs. aean 1987 10 18 14 17 12 14 
Co11p. overall aean 1987 11 19 14 17 13 15 
Overall abs. 11ean 1986 12 18 18 14 14 15 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Table 4 
Cell entries are Pearson's contingency coefficients C, i.e.: 
chi2 
C=(--------)1/2 
chi2+N 
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corrected for degrees of freedom (so that the maximum value always is 1) 
by dividing by the theoretical maximum of C, i.e. 
min(rows, colUJms)-1 
(----------------------)1/2 
1in(rows, columns) 
They have been multiplied by 100 to avoid the decimal point. Significances 
reported are those of the corresponding chi2 values. 
By convention, C is positive. However, in order to make the directions of 
associations visible, signs have been assigned here by assuming variables to 
be "ordinal". Their "positive" or "upper" ends have been assumed as follows: 
Sex: female 
Age: older 
Education: longer 
Occupation: white collar 
Respondent or husband or son has been or is in Bundeswehr: yes 
Military balance, U.S.-USSR military balance, Nuclear balance, Conven-
tional balance: East superior 
Communist threat: high 
Feasibility of defense: unlikely 
Nuclear deterrence: acceptance 
Likelihood of war without nuclear weapons: higher 
Relations FRG-USSR: will improve 
USSR abuses cooperation: yes 
V .S. want military equilibrium: yes 
NATO membership of FRG: favor 
Withdrawal of V .S. troops: opposed 
U.S. troops secure peace: agreement 
U.S. troops improve security of FRG: agreement 
Benefit from U.S. troops: for FRG 
Feasibility of defense without U.S. troops: unlikely 
Relations Germans-U .S. troops: good 
FRG-French brigade: favor 
Keep nuclear weapons or rely on conventional: nuclear 
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Notes to Table 4 (continued) 
International situation and military spending: higher spending 
Military spending: higher spending 
Behavior if attacked: resist 
Interest in Bundeswehr: high 
Bundeswehr good for peace: agreement 
Arms of Bundeswehr sufficient: disagreement 
Training and leadership of Bundeswehr sufficient: agreement 
Evaluation of voluntary military service: positive 
Evaluation of draf t resisters: positive 
Manpower problems of Bundeswehr are serious: agreement 
Association of Bundeswehr with parties: Bundeswehr independent 
Estimated support for peace movement in population: high 
a: p<.05 
b: p<.01 
c: p<.001 
d: No direction could be assumed for this variable 
*:More than .1strongerin1987 
#: More than .1 weaker in 1987 
ranks fourth (C=.12); generally such contact is associated with more fa-
vorable views on military defense. The weakest relationship of these opin-
ions exists with sex (C=.10); usually women can be seen tobe a little more 
skeptical than men. 
If one compares the strength of associations across groups of items, one 
finds that they are strongest for attitudes on military expenditures and on 
behavior in case of an attack (the mean absolute Cis .18). In this group of 
questions, relations with all five background variables are about equally 
strong, whereas in all other groups of items the relations with age and occu-
pation are strongest, and those with sex and experience with the 
Bundeswehr are weakest. lt is also in this group that one finds one of the 
few really strong relationships documented in Table 4, i.e., between sex and 
responses to how one would personally behave in case of a military aggres-
sion against the Federal Republic. Not surprisingly, males are far more likely 
than females to say that they would fight or somehow resist. 
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Questions about the Bundeswehr follow second in the strength of their asso-
ciation with respondents' social background. Within this group two more 
remarkably strong coefficients occur. One is between sex and interest in 
matters relating to the Bundeswehr, where we find women (who are more 
critical of defense matters, as we have seen) substantially less interested 
(C=.40). The second is between age and evaluations of men who voluntarily 
join the Bundeswehr; here we discem that such evaluations get noticeably 
better the older respondents are (C = .34). In all other five categories of 
questions, not a single contingency coefficient above .30 can be found. By 
average strength of associations, their rank order is: attitudes on NATO and 
U.S. troops (.15), on the national security environment and on the peace 
movement (both .12), on the superpowers (.10), and, finally, on nuclear 
weapons and deterrence (.09). 
Only a few of the coefficients reported in Table 4 do not conform to the 
general covariations summarized above, i.e., that men, older respondents, 
people with less education, blue-collar or white-collar employees, or re-
spondents with experience with the Bundeswehr tend to hold more favor-
able views toward military defense. Most noteworthy among these "excep-
tions" are the following observations: better educated respondents, even 
though they are less likely to concede Eastem military superiority than 
others in general terms, are more prone than others to recognize Warsaw 
Pact conventional superiority. These better educated people also deviate 
from their otherwi~ predominant pattems of attitudes in that they are more 
willing than others to fight in case of an aggression against the Federal Re-
public; the same deviation occurs among self-employed respondents and 
public servants. Regarding interest in matters conceming the Bundeswehr, 
several relations with social background variables are reversed against the 
predominant pattems. Those who have experience with the Bundeswehr are 
more interested and are generally more favorably inclined toward security 
issues; women are much less interested than men and are less favorable in 
their views. But for the other three background variables we find that those 
groups of respondents with stronger pro-def ense, etc., opinions tend to be 
less interested in these issues, and vice versa. Finally, women depart from 
their otherwise less positive attitudes toward the Bundeswehr by being more 
willing than men to describe it as independent from West German political 
parties. 
For those questions that have been asked both in 1986 andin 1987, Table 4 
shows that associations of national security opinions with social background 
variables have been rather small, but quite stable. The average absolute val-
322 
ues of C in both years look very similar, regarclless of whether one averages 
by survey question or by background variable. Changes of sign from one 
year to the next have occurred only for insignificant coefficients. Only in 
nine cases does the difference between 1987 and 1986 exceed .10. Five of 
these cases involve education, where once there was an increase of more 
than .10, and four coefficients decreased by more than that amount, which 
leaves the impression that a slight decline of the importance of education has 
been the major change between these two years in terms of how national 
security attitudes were associated with social background variables. 
In summary, we can say that these opinions in the Federal Republic do in 
fact differ between socially defined groups, and that many of these associa-
tions correspond to widespread notions, particularly those involving age and 
education. We can also say that these covariations are quite stable, at least in 
the short run. However, apart from a few exceptions, their magnitude is not 
very impressive, even for age. lt has been demonstrated various times that 
national security attitudes in West Germany, of all commonly used social 
characteristics, covary most strongly with age (Rattinger 1985, 1987; Rattin-
ger and Heinlein 1986). The same finding has emerged here. But the moder-
ate strength of these relationships does not support the notion that genera-
tional succession is the most important factor for aligning these opinions in 
the Federal Republic, at least not at the level of the mass public (for a 
contrary view see Szabo 1983, 1984). 
3.2. Covariation with partisan preference 
Turning now to the connection between security-related attitudes and parti-
san preferences (Table 5, last column), we discem the familiar fact that 
these are much stronger, with an absolute average contingency coefficient of 
.34. Without exception, these coefficients are significantly different from 
zero, and, without exception, their signs are as one would predict from the 
simple argument that views on military security get less and less favorable as 
one travels across the political spectrum from "right" to "left," which in the 
West German case means from the CDU/CSU via the FDP and the SPD to 
the Green party. 
With an average absolute C of .47, attitudes on NATO and U.S. troops de-
ployed in the Federal Republic covary most strongly with party preferences. 
Such associations are highest with respondents' positions on whether these 
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forces should be withdrawn, and on whether or not their deployment makes 
peace more secure. Opinions on nuclear weapons and deterrence rank sec-
ond in partisan polarization. Evaluations of military expenditures and of the 
Bundeswehr come next (both with mean absolute C of .33). The strongest 
partisan disagreements here occur about the size of the West German de-
fense budget, the evaluation of men who voluntarily serve in the armed for-
ces, and about whether or not the existence of the Bundeswehr makes peace 
more secure. Opinions about the superpowers are polarized by party below 
average (mean absolute C of .29), but the trustworthiness of the Soviet 
Union is judged quite differently by the various partisan groups. Perceptions 
of the national security environment and attitudes toward the peace move-
ment are least dissimilar between groups of partisans (with mean absolute C 
of 21 and .20, respectively). Within the first group of survey questions the 
strongest partisan disagreement exists over the extent of a communist threat 
for the Federal Republic (C=.36). 
Changes between 1986 and 1987 are minimal; for comparable items the 
average absolute contingency coefficient was higher in 1987 than in 1986 by 
.02. Only for three variables does the difference of C between these two 
years exceed .10: polarization over whether U.S. forces in Europe make 
peace more or less secure and of interest in the Bundeswehr and related 
matters has increased more than this amount, and it has fallen by more than 
.10 over whether or not the Bundeswehr has a special affiliation with one of 
the West German parties. 
3.3. Covariation among attitudes on security 
The final step of this analysis is to look at some interrelations among nation-
al security attitudes. As the data is very limited here, no complete matrix of 
covariations can be presented, and nothing even resembling a standard fac-
tor analysis can be performed. Only crosstabulations of all survey questions 
with three selected items were available: the extent of communist threat, po-
sitions on U .S. withdrawal, and opinions about the effects of the existence of 
the Bundeswehr for peace. But even with this limited set of data some im-
portant observations can be recorded (Table 5, first Cour columns). 
In the average, the results for the 1987 survey questions are as strongly as-
sociated with these three items as with partisan sympathies (mean absolute 
C of .34). The highest contingency coefficients again occur in the group of 
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Table 5: Associations among national security attitudes, and between na-
tional security attitudes and party preference, 1987 and 1986 
Peace 
1ore Abs. 
secure mean 
Cou. u.s. throuqh col. 
threat withdr. Bundesw. l-3e Party 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National security environ1ent 
Military balance 29c 21c 24C 25 19c 
1986: 34C 29c 20c 28 23c 
u.s.-USSR military balance 23c 09a# 11c 16 21c 
1986: 26c 2oc 16c 21 15c 
Nuclear balance 30C 23c 28c 27 20c 
Conventional balance 27c 19C 23c 23 17C 
ColllUilist threat looc 33C 18c 26 36c 
1986: looc 29c 27c 28 35C 
Feasibility of defense 26c 03 00 10 13b 
1986: 28c 00 03 10 09a 
Abs. aean 1987e 27 18 18 21 21 
Comparable mean 1987e 26 17 15 19 22 
Abs. mean 1986e 29 20 17 22 21 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Huclear weapons and deterrence 
39C* Huclear deterrence 40C 34C 38 39C 
1986: 27c 35c 36c 33 34C 
Likelihood of war without 
nuclear weapons 47c uc 20c 36 39C 
Abs. mean 1987 43 41 27 37 39 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Superpowers 
-34c* Relations FRG-USSR -14C -13C 20 -20C 
1986: -19c -18c -22c 20 -14b 
USSR abuses cooperation 61C 23c 16c 35 33C 
1986: 54C 26C 21c 34 44C 
u.s. want milit. equilibrium 21c 43C uc 35 30C 
1986: 25c 48C 34C 36 32c 
Abs. aean 1987 39 28 23 30 29 
Abs. tean 1986 33 31 26 30 30 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 5 (continued) Peace 
more Abs. 
secure mean 
CoJDll. u.s. through col. 
threat witbdr. Bundesw. 1-3e Party 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NATO and U.S. troops 
NATO membership of FRG 25c 71c 71C 56 5oc 
1986: JlC 66C 71C 56 49c 
Witbdrawal of u.s. troops 34c 10oc 53C 46 56C 
1986: 2sc 1ooc 53C 41 43C 
u.s. troops secure peace JlC soc 69c 60 6oc* 
1986: 33C 76C 64c 58 49C 
u.s. troops improve 
security of FRG 39C 35C 1oc 65 52c 
1986: 41c 33c 73c 66 50c 
Benefit from u.s. troops 32c soc 61C 58 44C 
1986: 3oc sie 6QC 57 42c 
Defense without u.s. troops 24c 49C 22c 32 36C 
1986: JlC 49C 26C 35 29c 
Relations Germans-u.s. troops 26c 49C 43c* 39 37C 
1986: 22c 53c 32c 36 29c 
FRG-French brigade 15c 33C 21c 23 44C 
Abs. 11ean 1937e 28 64 52 47 47 
Comparable mean 1937e 30 69 56 51 47 
Abs. mean 1986e 31 68 54 50 42 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military expenditures and bebavior in case of attack 
Keep nuclear weapons or 
rely on conventional 26c 26C 11c 23 27c 
International situation 
and military spending 5oc* 53C* 43C 50 33c 
1986: 33c 47c 4oc 42 44c 
Military spending 41C 62C 53C 54 44c 
1986: 35C 56C 63C 51 46C 
Bebavior if attacked 27c 4oc* 2sc 32 23c 
1986: 19c 26c 25c 23 JlC 
Abs. mean 1987 36 47 37 40 33 
Comparable mean 1987 39 54 44 45 35 
Abs. mean 1986 31 43 43 39 40 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 5 (continued) Peace 
more Abs. 
secure mean 
Cou. u.s. through col. 
threat withdr. Bundesw. 1-3e Party 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bundeswehr 
Interest in Bundeswehr 25c* 13c 13C 17 27c* 
1986: 14C 15c 14C 14 ua 
Bundeswehr good f or peace 17c 53C 1ooc 38 47C 
1986: 26C 54C 1ooc 40 52c 
Arms of Bundesw. sufficient 33c 17C 12c 22 15c 
1986: 33c 12c 10b 20 12b 
Training and leadership 
19c# of Bundeswehr suff icient -na 27c 19 19c 
1986: -16c uc 37C 31 23c 
Evaluat. of military service 32c 63C* 53c 51 51c 
1986: 23c 49C 51c 43 45C 
Evaluat. of draft resisters -JlC -41C -45c 39 -42c 
1986: -JQC -4oc -4oc 37 -36C 
Hanpower problellS of 
Bundeswehr are serious 33C 65c 43C 50 44c 
1986: 37c 62C 5oc 50 43C 
Association of Bundeswehr 
with parties 09 JQC 24c# 21 21c# 
1986: 11c 35C 33C 30 33C 
Abs. 11ean 1937e 25 38 32 32 33 
Abs. mean 1986e 26 39 34 33 33 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peace movement 
Estimated popular support -13c -17C -13c 18 -19c 
1986: -15c -26c -20C 20 -24c 
Goals of peace movementd 27c 16c na 18 21a 
1986: 24c 21c 09a 18 2sc 
Abs. mean 1987 23 17 15 18 20 
Abs. mean 1986 20 24 15 19 26 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall abs. mean 1987e 30 39 33 34 34 
Comp. overall mean 1987e 30 41 35 35 35 
Overall abs. mean 1986e 28 41 35 35 33 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Notes to Table 5 
Cell entries are defined as in Table 4. CDU /CSU-voters have been assumed 
tobe at the "positive" or "upper" end of partisanship. 
a to d: as for Table 4 
e: "Main diagonal" associations ( C = 100) are excluded from means 
*:More than .1strongerin1987 
#:More than .1weakerin1987 
questions about NATO and U.S. troops (.47 average). Not surprisingly, 
questions about West German membership in NATO, whether U.S. forces 
in Europe make peace more secure, whether they improve the security of 
the Federal Republic, and about who benefits from their presence, all are 
particularly strongly related to positions on the withdrawal of these forces 
(C-values over .70). Moreover, answers to these four questions also are 
strongly associated with judgments on whether or not the Bundeswehr 
makes peace more secure (C-values above .60). Opinions about the military 
budget and statements about respondents' behavior if the Federal Republic 
came under attack are also quite strongly related to attitudes toward these 
three items, with an average C of .40. Several coefficients exceed .50, and 
the covariation is highest with positions about U.S. withdrawal. 
Next in intensity of relations with these three questions comes the group of 
items on nuclear weapons and deterrence (.37 average). Estimates about the 
likelihood of war without nuclear weapons are particularly strongly related 
to judgments about the extent of a communist threat (C=.47). With a mean 
absolute C of .32, attitudes toward the Bundeswehr are roughly average in 
terms of being associated with other items. Tue highest coefficients (all 
above .50) here occur between evaluations of voluntary military service and 
judgments of whether or not the Bundeswehr makes peace more secure, and 
between attitudes on the withdrawal of U.S. forces, on the one band, and 
evaluations of the Bundeswehr, of its manpower problems, and of voluntary 
military service, on the other band. Attitudes toward the superpowers, per-
ceptions of the national security environment, and evaluations of the peace 
movement are related to these three items on communist threat, U.S. forces, 
and the Bundeswehr least strongly (average absolute C of .30, .21, and .18, 
respectively). The strongest single covariations here are between perception 
of communist threat and suspicion of Soviel motives ( .61 ), between opinions 
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about U.S. withdrawal and suspicion of American motives (.43), between 
perception of communist threat and opinions about U.S. withdrawal (.33), 
and between perceptions of the nuclear balance and of communist threat 
(.30). 
Again there are no major changes in these structures of attitudes between 
1986 and 1987, as far as comparable data are available. Eight coefficients 
have grown by more than .10, and three have fallen by more than that 
amount between these two years. All four such changes involving percep-
tions of communist threat are upward, and the mean absolute covariation of 
this variable with all repeated survey questions has increased from .28 to 
.30, so that one could speculate that the role of such perceptions in shaping 
national security attitudes has become a little more important. 
These findings, limited as they are, need to be interpreted in at least two in-
terrelated respects: first, what do they teil us about any underlying attitudi-
nal structure that can explain the responses to individual survey questions, 
and, second, do they reflect a high degree of attitudinal constraint in the 
mass public's views on these issues? Both of these questions cannot be an-
swered quite satisfactorily, due to the limitations of the available data, so 
that only some preliminary speculations can be offered. 
As to the first point, it is useful to conceive of the survey items, which in 
Tables 4 and 5 have been organized according to the objects of opinions, as 
being representative of a few hierarchically interrelated more general con-
cepts (see Hurwitz and Peffiey 1987, for an excellent analysis along these 
lines). Figure 13 represents such an attempt for the 1987 data. The attitades 
included in this figure fall into four broad categories: perceptions of the se-
curity environment of the Federal Republic and of the superpowers (judg-
ments about the military balance and about communist threat, suspicion of 
Soviet and trust in U.S. intentions); attitudes on deterrence and defense as 
very general approaches to provide security; evaluations of the concrete 
"organizational" implementation of deterrence and defense (NATO, the 
Bundeswehr, and the U .S. military presence ); and opinions about the opera-
tional implications of this organizational setup ( military service and defense 
expenditures). The criterion for selecting individual survey items for inclu-
sion in this diagram is whether they stand in a particularly strong relation-
ship with other items, or whether there is a noteworthy absence of associa-
tions. 
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Figure 13: Selected hierarchical associations among national security atti-
tudes, 1987 (contingency coefficients C from Table 5, as defined in note to 
Table 4) 
1--------------------.21--------------------1 
1 1 
Kilitary--~.29-----Colllluniat-----.61-----suapicion Trust 
balance threat ot USSR in u. s. 
1----------.21--------->I 
1--.39-->I 
V V 
1 <---------------1 Raliance on Reaist .43 
1 deterrence aqgression 
1--.40-->I 
1<------.34-----1--1-------1 
1 1-----.40------1-------->I 
.17 !------------------. 34------1-----> 1 
1-----.2s---->I 
1 <----------. 2 a-----------1----------------1 
1 1 
V V V 
Bundeswehr 
V 
PRG should 
V V V V 
Opposed 
qood f or--------- . 11---------remain in---------. 71---------to u. s. 
peace NATO withdrawal 
1------------------------. 58------------------------1 
.58 .62 
1---------------------------.sa------~----------------->I 
1<--------------------------.63--------------------------1--1 
1 
V V V V 
Military Defense 
service expenditures 
PERCBPTIONS 
or Sl!CllllI'l'Y 
l!llVIROlll!l!llT 
DB'l'ERRBllCI! 
AJID Dl!l"ElfSB 
CONCRETE 
SBCURITY 
ARRAllGEllElfTS 
SPBCU'IC 
IllPLICATIONS 
330 
The assumption in setting up this hierarchy, of course, is that of a certain de-
gree of causal dependence as one proceeds across its levels. Opinions about 
the operational consequences of specific security arrangements are expected 
to be influenced by the evaluations of these arrangements themselves. These 
evaluations, in turn, are considered to be affected by more abstract attitudes 
on deterrence and defense and by perceptions of the security environment. 
The hierarchical ordering in Figure 13 suggests that attitudes on deterrence 
and defense are viewed as also being dependent upon perceptions of the se-
curity environment, so that the eff ect of the latter on evaluations of security 
arrangements would be both direct and indirect. One could argue otherwise, 
of course, that perceptions of the security environment are not antecedents 
of attitudes on deterrence and defense, but that both are independent pre-
dictors of evaluations of concrete security arrangements, at the same level in 
a causal hierarchy. Which view is more correct evidently is an empirical 
question. 
Unfortunately, this question cannot be decided on the basis of a rigorous 
causal analysis, as Figure 13 only represents bivariate covariations (from 
Table 5). Similarly, this grouping together of items into broader concepts 
does not reflect the results of any empirical data analysis, such as factor 
analysis, but is solely derived from theoretical considerations about how dif-
ferent bundles of security opinions might be related to each other. In spite of 
these shortcomings, a number of interesting observations can be made in 
Figure 13 that can serve as hypotheses for future and more rigorous studies. 
First, within the items grouped under perceptions of the security en-
vironment, it is striking that perceptions of communist threat are only weak-
ly related to judgments about the East-West military balance, but covary 
strongly with suspicions of Soviet intentions. General images of the Soviet 
Union appear to be much more important than the military balance for 
shaping threat perceptions - which implies that even if one would succeed in 
convincing a much higher proportion of the West German population of 
Eastem superiority this would not necessarily raise threat perceptions a 
great deal. Even though we are dealing with cross-sectional data here, not 
with longitudinal data, it appears plausible that this decoupling of percep-
tions of threat and of the military balance has allowed the sense of a com-
munist threat to decline considerably as distrust of Soviet intentions has fal-
len since the ascent of the new Soviet leadership, even though the military 
balance definitely has not shifted in favor of the Westover these years. 
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The second important observation is that at the level of concrete security ar-
rangements, attitudes on continuing NATO membership of the Federal Re-
public, on the presence of U.S. troops, and on the utility of the Bundeswehr 
covary quite strongly. People who regard favorably the role of the 
Bundeswehr for the preservation of peace also tend to endorse membership 
in NATO and to oppose withdrawal of U.S. forces. There is no logical ne-
cessity for this pattem, as within a concept of "armed neutrality" people 
could regard the Bundeswehr as useful, but at the same time disapprove of 
belonging to NATO and of the American military presence. Empirically, 
however, this view is a rare exception: Only three percent of those who 
agree that the existence of the Bundeswehr makes peace more secure would 
like to see West Germany's NATO membership terminated, and only 15 
percent of these respondents would prefer to see U .S. forces withdrawn. In 
factor analytic terms it therefore appears as if empirically there is only one 
Bundeswehr and Western alliance factor at work in shaping responses to 
single opinion items, rather than two separate factors, a Bundeswehr and 
national defense dimension, and a NATO and alliance with the U.S. dimen-
sion. Predominantly the Bundeswehr is either endorsed as contributing to 
peace within the alliance framework, or it is rejected together with this 
framework. 
Whereas these first two findings were on "horizontal" consistency - i.e., on 
items assumed to fall under one and the same broader concept - the next 
two observations relate to "vertical" consistency - i.e., to the covariations 
between items representing different levels in this hierarchy. Here we have 
to note, first, that perceptions of the security environment and attitudes on 
deterrence and defense have only moderate effects on the positions people 
take on the organizational arrangements to provide military security for the 
Federal Republic, and that attitudes on deterrence and defense also are only 
moderately influenced by perceptions of the security environment. Our data 
show only weak evidence for the expectation that the Bundeswehr and the 
alliance with the U.S. within NATO would be endorsed more strongly as 
people perceive a communist threat and accept deterrence and military de-
fense as abstract foundations of security. The associations we find all are in 
the direction predicted by such an expectation, to be sure, bot their strength 
is not impressive. The strongest link of all (.43) exists between trust in U.S. 
intentions and opposition to withdrawal of American troops. 
We therefore have to conceive of support for the Bundeswehr and the al-
liance as, to a considerable degree, independent or decoupled from percep-
tions of the security environment (the average of pertinent C coefficients in 
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Figure 13 is .30), as weil as from general attitudes on deterrence and de-
fense, with the latter having a somewhat stronger effect (average C of .36). 
Similarly, these attitudes on deterrence and defense are not very strongly 
shaped by threat perceptions (average C of .33). In other words, sizeable 
proportions of the West German population do not hold positive views on 
deterrence and military defense !Jecause of their perception of communist 
threat, and do not agree with the country's security arrangements !Jecause of 
perception of threat and abstract endorsement of deterrence and defense. 
Judgments that the Bundeswehr contributes toward peace, and that NATO 
membership and the presence of American forces should be maintained, for 
many people, do not seem to require preceding threat perceptions and 
general beliefs in deterrence and defense. Even though one has to be careful 
with such interpretations, because we are analyzing cross-sectional data, one 
could suspect that this absence of stronger vertical linkages has been a very 
important factor in preventing the strong decline of suspicion of the Soviet 
Union and of perceptions of communist threat over the past years (Figures 3 
and 6) from translating into a similarly marked drop of support for the Bun-
deswehr or for the Western alliance (Figures 9 and 12). lt should be noted 
that this finding of an only moderate effect of threat perceptions on support 
for institutional security arrangements does not contradict earlier results: 
when the crosstabulation of threat perceptions with judgments about the im-
portance of the Bundeswehr from the 1979 survey in this series (Rattinger 
1985, Table 4.29) is recomputed into the adjusted C contingency coefficient 
used here to measure covariations, a value of .29 is obtained, which is of the 
same order of magnitude as reported for 1986 and 1987 in Table 5. 
The second set of "vertical" associations in Figure 13 link judgments about 
concrete security arrangements for the Federal Republic to opinions on spe-
cific implications of these arrangements, i.e., on military service and defense 
outlays. Not surprisingly, these associations are quite strong (average C of 
.60). Respondents who feel that the Bundeswehr contributes to making 
peace more secure and wish American troops to stay in West Germany are 
far more likely than others to evaluate service in the military more positively 
and to be less skeptical about military expenditures. That these relationships 
are not even stronger, however, is also not surprising. Support for a policy 
does not necessarüy imply support for the spending it involves or readiness 
for personal behavior in accordance with this policy. Many people do want a 
variety of societal goals to be realized, but they do not want government to 
spend a lot of "their" money on them. This is true for many policy arenas, 
like social security, environmental protection, or foreign aid, and there is no 
reason why it should be different for defense matters. But nevertheless we 
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observe this second "instrumental" aspect of vertical attitude constraint or 
consistency to be much stronger than the first one. Perceptions of the secu-
rity environment and general attitudes on deterrence and defense do not as-
sist a great deal in predicting whether people will be in favor of the 
Bundeswehr and of NATO. Bot if they are, the likelihood that they also 
support the specific consequences of these security arrangements is quite 
high, and vice versa. 
These findings also facilitate a partial answer to the second question posed 
above for the degree of attitudinal constraint - which is a little like re-
questing a determination whether a glass of water is half full or half empty, 
of course. We have seen (in Table 5 and Figure 13) some strong or even 
very strong indications of attitude constraint. However, many of tbese have 
occurred when the two survey items were substantively very close together, 
or almost even multiple measurements (e.g., should U.S. forces be with-
drawn, and do they enhance West German security). In many other instan-
ces there is an ominous lack of consistency: perception of a communist 
threat has very little to do witb perceptions of tbe military balance, en-
dorsement of tbe Bundeswehr and of NATO membership is only weakly 
related to threat perception, judgments about whetber the Federal Republic 
could be defended witbout U.S. troops covary only moderately with posi-
tions on the withdrawal of these forces, etc. Often respondents' positions on 
one isolated question could be predicted more reliably from tbeir party 
preference than from their views on another question. This has repeatedly 
been documented and explained before (see, e.g., Rattinger 1985). The data 
used for this study so far do not soggest tbat attitude constraint of defense 
opinions in the West German mass public has become any stronger in the 
late than in the early 1980s, all public debate over these issues notwith-
standing. The crucial follow-on questions then are, of course, whether, how 
and why respondents are differentiated in terms of the existence of reason-
ably coherent views on these matters. lt is highly plausible to suspect that 
behind the aggregate picture of some moderate but substantively uneven at-
titude consistency that has been described here, we will find a continuum 
from people with almost random responses to those with very elaborate 
opinions. The groups along this continuum should be clearly identifiable by 
their substantive views and by the extent to which they belong to the atten-
tive "issue public" (for a recent analysis of information levels about security 
issues see Graham 1988). But without access to the complete original data 
sets of these (and other) studies, this required differentiation cannot be per-
formed, and speculation can be endless. 
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4. Conclusion 
Public opinion and appeals directed at public opinion have pJayed a major 
role in the defense debate of the early 1980s in West Germany, bot the 
structure and dynamics of security-related mass attitudes still are far from 
being f ully understood. In spite of its methodological limitations, this contri-
bution has been able to clearly confirm several earlier results and to yield 
some novel findings on trends, correlates, and the structure of defense opin-
ions in the Federal Republic. 
As to trends, the longitudinal perspective adopted in the first part of the ar-
ticle demonstrates that - contrary to contemporary allegations - really im-
pressive changes in the distributions of mass opinions have not occurred dur-
ing the INF deployment debate, and not in attitudes on the framework of 
Western defense, but rather in evaluations of the Soviet Union after the 
most recent reshuffling of its leadership. In comparison to this reorientation, 
all the shifts in marginal opinion distributions about NATO or the U.S. that 
were assigned highest significance in the early 1980s appear as ridiculously 
small. This erosion of suspicion of Soviet intentions has made the threat 
from the Bast appear much smaller than previously. The Soviet Union is no 
longer regarded in Cold War terms as an evil empire. By many West 
Germans it has for quite some time now been seen as a very mighty op-
ponent, but without posing an immediate military threat. The developments 
in the Soviet Union over the past years have brought its remaining 
"negatives" down substantially; it is evaluated as a far more trustworthy and 
much less intrinsically mischievous adversary. lt seems as if it would take 
major spectacular events to reverse this. 
This work confirms what has been reported earlier about how security-re-
lated opinions in West Germany are structured according to the sociaI char-
acteristics and partisan preferences of respondents. Age and, to a lesser ex-
tent, education do play a role in differentiating attitude pattems, but this is 
not an overriding role. Generational replacement explanations retain a cer-
tain relevance, but they are counteracted by lif e-cycle effects and over-
whelmed by the strong polarization of these opinions along partisan lines. 
Generational replacement can account for the quite massive changes in the 
image of the Soviet Union only to a very small degree. Even the slight in-
crease of skepticism over NATO, the Bundeswehr, and the presence of 
American forces in the course of the 1980s can better be explained by the 
gradual expansion of Green sympathizers (which is far from having involved 
only younger voters, of course) than by the influx of new cohorts into the 
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electorate. Party preference thus remains the one single variable along 
which security opinions are most visibly aligned, but there are some 
indications in the data presented here that this polarization is about to 
decline. If these indications should in fact be bome out by further develop-
ments, this will probably be due to reduced salience of the issues after the 
INF Treaty and to a corresponding tendency of the parties to move some-
what closer with their positions in the post-INF world. 
Regarding the interrelations and structure of West German security opin-
ions, this analysis has shown that a variety of attitudinal dimensions must be 
at work in shaping survey responses, and that there are striking examples of 
both the existence and the absence of attitude constraints. The most sig-
nificant finding here is that endorsement of the Bundeswehr and of the Wes-
tern alliance falls together in one joint "package," but that the acceptance of 
this "package" of security arrangements is only weakly related to threat per-
ceptions. This can explain why since the change in the Soviet leadership the 
image of the Soviet Union could improve so greatly, and the sense of a 
communist threat could fall so much as a consequence, without any signifi-
cant repercussions for the popular willingness to accept long-established se-
curity arrangements. There are at least two explanations for this failure of 
support for NATO, the U.S. military presence, and the Bundeswehr to fol-
low perceptions of threat on their downward course: First, judgments on in-
stitutional security arrangements could in fact already have been Iargely de-
coupled from evaluations of threat for quite some time, because they have 
come to be regarded as normal elements of an insurance policy in a world 
that is neither necessarily benign nor fully predictable. Even though the 
threat might have receded, this insurance policy might be perceived to have 
worked, and since things have been done that way for quite some time now, 
it might make sense to people to leave them that way, just in case. Anal-
ternative explanation would be that there is a longer time-lag between wan-
ing perceptions of threat and a possible subsequent erosion of support for 
the conventional security framework, so that the long-term consequences of 
the improving image of the Soviet Union are yet to come. With the structur-
al analysis in this contribution restricted to one cross-section, it is impossible 
here to decide once and for all which is the superior explanation. However, 
in view of the comparative data from the late 1970s that were reported ear-
lier, this author would somewhat lean toward the first interpretation if 
forced to risk a prediction. Nevertheless, the confrontation of these rival ex-
planations underlines the utility of further pursuing the approach taken here 
- i.e., to combine longitudinal with cross-sectional perspectives - and leaves 
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us with an intriguing question for the future. Whatever the final answer will 
be, the political implications should not be underestimated. 
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Appendix 1: The surveys 
In 1962 the Federal Ministry of Defense initiated an annual series of major opinion polls on 
national security issues, known as the "Verteidigungsklima" surveys. In later years their name 
was changed to "Meinungsbild zur wehrpolitischen Lage." For about the past two decades, 
these polls have always been conducted in August of each year. Close to 2,000 (personal) in-
terviews of about 25 minutes duration are usually realized. In most years the surveys have not 
been designed as single-sample and single-theme studies, but have been included in two sepa-
rate multi-theme (omnibus) polls of about one-hour duration, and with sample-sizes of around 
1,000. EMNID (Bielefeld) has been responsible for these surveys from the outset. Many ques-
tions have received no or very little change since the series was begun. Tue assistance of the 
Ministry in making the complete reports for these studies available is greatly appreciated. 
Appendix 2: Ouestion wording 
Questions appear here in the order they were asked. 
Estimated support for peace movement in population: "Let us now talk about the peace 
movement. Leaving aside your own position towards the peace movernent, what do you think, 
how many percent of the population support the peace movement?" 
Goals of peace movement: "Here on this !ist there are some possible goals of the peace 
rnovement. What do you think is the main goal of the peace movement?" 
List: Neutra! status for the Federal Republic, unilateral disarmament of the West, balanced 
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arms control agreement between East and West, reduction of nuclear intermediate-range mis-
siles in the Federal Republic, protection of the environment, protection against cuts in avail-
able social programs. 
FRG-French brigade: "A few weeks ago parts of the Federal Government have come up 
with the idea to create a joint military unit (brigade) among the Bundeswehr and the French 
army. lf you assume that such a brigade, in which German as weil as French soldiers would 
serve, would be created, would you rather welcome or reject this?" 
Manpower problems of Bundeswehr are serious: "In the foreseeable future it could be that 
the Bundeswehr will not be able to recruit as many men as necessary, due to declining birth 
rates, and that the Bundeswehr therefore will no langer be able to meet its commitments to 
NATO. Do you think this is very serious, serious, not so serious, or not at all serious?" 
Likelihood or war without nuclear weapons: "Assume there were no nuclear weapons any 
more in East and West, only conventional weapons were left. Do you believe that a war in 
Europe would be more likely then, because the threat with nuclear weapons (nuclear deter-
rence) would be gone, or would it not be more likely?" 
Military balance: "What do you believe, which bloc is presently militarily superior, NATO or 
the Eastem bloc (Warsaw Pact)?" 
Nuclear balance: "And what do you think is the situation for nuclear weapons? Which mili-
tary bloc do you believe is stronger in nuclear weapons?" 
Conventional balance: "How is this constellation for conventional weapons? Which alliance 
do you believe has the stronger conventional armaments?" 
Keep nuclear weapons or rely on conventional: "lncreasing conventional weapons could 
compensate for abolishing nuclear weapons. This would probably mean higher costs. Which 
solution would you rather accept to guarantee our security: Abolishing nuclear weapons and 
increasing costs for expanding conventional armaments, or retaining the financial burden and 
nuclear weapons?" 
NATO membership of FRG: "Frequently there are discussions in the Federal Republic about 
the Alliance. What do you think, should we continue as member of NATO, do you think it 
would be better to leave NATO, or what eise do you think?" 
U.S.-USSR military balance: "Are the armed forces of the U.S. - all in all - equally strong as 
those of the Russians, are they stronger than those of the Russians, or weaker?" 
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Feasibility of defense: "Assuming the Russians and the people's anny of the GDR attack us, 
do you believe that NATO, including the Bundeswehr, is strong enough to protect us effec-
tively, or do you believe that the Russians would overwhelm us?" 
Communist threat: "Do you believe that the communist threat is very high. high, not that 
high, or is it not tobe taken seriously?" 
Behavior if attacked: "How would you behave in case of an anned attack on the Federal Re-
public? Would you fight. would you, if you have no military training, somehow fight and resist, 
or would you reject both?" 
International situation and military spending: "Three men talk about the situation of our 
national security and about whether spending for the Bundeswehr should be changed. Their 
opinions are on this list. Which opinion do you think is most correct?" 
List: The first says: 1 think the situation is dangerous, spending for the Bundeswehr should be 
increased. The second says: We have to spend as much for the Bundeswehr as other countries, 
1 mean as much as those in West and East spend per capita on their defense. Tbc third says: 1 
think that in the present situation we can afford certain savings in spending for the Bundes-
wehr. 
Military spending: "Do you think that the Federal Republic spends far too much, too much, 
about right, too little, or far too little on its defense?" 
Arms of Bundeswehr sufficient: "Are the armaments of the Bundeswehr sufficiently strong 
for its objectives, or are its armaments too weak?" 
Training and leadership of Bundeswehr sufficient: "And what do you think about training 
and Jeadership in the Bundeswehr? Are they good, sufficient, lacking, or insufficient?" 
Association of Bundeswehr with parties: "In your opinion, is there a party among those re-
presented in the Bundestag with which the Bundeswehr has better relations than with others, 
and which party is this? Or do you think that the Bundeswehr is neutral in terms of partisan 
politics?" 
Bundeswehr good for peace: "Do you believe that the existence of the Bundeswehr is an 
obstacle for effective detente with the East, and thus rather a danger for peace, or do you be-
lieve that the existence of the Bundeswehr makes peace more secure?" 
Relations FRG-USSR: "Will our relations with the Soviet Union rather improve in the 
nearer future, will they remain unchanged, or will they rather deteriorate?" 
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Relations Germans-U.S. troops: "How would you generally describe the relations between 
the Americans stationed here and German citizens, are they very good, good, in between. or 
bad?" 
U.S. troops secure peace: "And does the fact that we have American soldiers in the Fcderal 
Republic improve the stability of peace, or is peace endangered by the presence of American 
soldiers?" 
U.S. troops improve security of FRG: "What do you think, is the presence of American 
troops in the Federal Republic indispensable for our security, important, of low importance, 
unimportant, or haz.ardous?" 
Benefit from American troops: "Who benefits most from the presence of American troops 
in the Federal Republic, mainly the Americans themselves, mainly ourselves, both equally, or 
nobody?" 
Withdrawal of U.S. troops: "All in all, would you be in favor of withdrawal or partial with-
drawal of the Americans from the Federal. Republic, or would you oppose an American with-
drawal?" 
Feasibility of defense without U.S. troops: "Do you believe that the Federal Republic 
would be strong enough, after an American withdrawal, to protect us effectively, together with 
the European troops of NATO, against a surprise attack, or do you believe that the troops of 
the Eastem bloc would overwhelm us?" 
USSR abuses cooperation: "Some people say that Moscow abuses our willingness to co-
operate in order to extend its power. Others say that the Soviet Union is serious about de-
tente. With which view would you agree?" 
U.S. want military equilibrium: "What do you think, what do the USA want, a military equi-
librium with the Soviet Union, superiority over the Soviet Union, or are the USA also ready 
to accept military inferiority?" 
Nuclear deterrence: "Two men talk about nuclear armaments in Europe. With which of these 
two opinions do you agree more?" 
List: First opinion: Since three decades nuclear weapons have been stationed in Europe, East 
and West. Since then we have been living on a powder-keg here. Tue use of nuclear weapons 
between East and West would be so terrible that one should immediately abolish nuclear 
weapons. Second opinion: Precisely because one knows how terrible the use of nuclear 
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weapons would be they have never been used in the past three decades. And because both 
sides are so afraid of their use, there also have been no major military conflicts between East 
and West. Without deterrence by nuclear weapons the danger of conventional war in Europe 
would be much higher. 
Interest in Bundeswehr: "Are you generally rather interested in the Bundeswehr and in top-
ics and problems conceming the Bundeswehr, or are you rather not interested?" 
Evaluation of voluntary military service: "Would you please show on this scale (from 1 to 
10) how positive (1) or negative (10) you evaluate a man who voluntarily has enlisted for ser-
vice in the Bundeswehr?" 
Evaluation of draft resisters: "Would you please also use this scale to show how positive or 
negative you evaluate a man who refuses to serve as a conscript?" 
